Designing for Policy Success by Compton, Mallory E. et al.
International Review of Public Policy 
1:2 | 2019
Regular Issue






International Public Policy Association
Printed version
Date of publication: 10 October 2019




Mallory E. Compton, Joannah Luetjens and Paul ‘t Hart, « Designing for Policy Success », International
Review of Public Policy [Online], 1:2 | 2019, Online since 10 December 2019, connection on 04 January
2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/514 
International Review of Public Policy is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International.
Designing for Policy Success
Mallory E. Compton






Amidst the general mood of skepticism about the problem-solving capacity of governments in 
the face of ‘wicked problems’, it is easy to overlook that at times governments do manage to 
design and implement public policies and programs quite successfully. In this paper, we build 
on an emerging area of ‘positive evaluation’ research into public policy successes (Bovens et 
al 2001; McConnell 2010; Nielsen et al 2015). Using the conceptual tools emanating from this 
research and drawing on a corpus of 33 such cases (Compton and ‘t Hart 2019; Luetjens et al, 
2019), we draw inferences about the contexts, strategies, and practices that are conducive to 
policy success. We find compelling evidence that process inclusivity is a pivotal factor, but cer-
tainly not the only one, on the path to policy success. Variation in the degree of innovation and 
the pace of change also emerge as interdependent and important factors.
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Introduction
The policy analysis field is rediscovering its long-held ambition (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987) to 
become a design science. New handbooks (Howlett and Mukherjee, 2018), monographs (Pe-
ters, 2018), textbooks (Howlett, 2019), compact surveys of the field (Peters et al, 2018), and 
even a dedicated journal (Policy Design and Practice), have emerged in this pursuit. The goal of 
these endeavors is to discover strategies and practices for effective policy design. To this end, 
policy design scholars analyze policy instrument choices and policy implementation processes, 
and they identify the mechanisms which link design features to implementation processes and 
policy outcomes (Busetti and Dente, 2018; Capano et al, 2019). To translate these findings into 
design maxims and practices to significantly increase the odds of policy success is the ultimate 
ambition of the endeavor.
This (re)turn to policy analysis as design holds considerable promise to give the field a sense 
of purpose and application-oriented allure. Such direction has been lacking since the field lost 
ground to an emphasis on developing general descriptive and explanatory models of policy 
processes and implementation (Linder and Peters 1987, 1988). Likewise, the design-oriented, 
hands-on, and applied agenda of the policy sciences has been overcome by a recognition of 
emerging megatrends such as globalization and the turn from government to governance on 
public policymaking (Howlett, 2014). Despite heroic efforts by some of their chief advocates 
(see Weible and Cairney, 2018), followers of this approach still have a long way to go before 
they have tangible, practical, and actionable strategies to offer to public policymakers. 
Rekindling the spirit of design within the policy sciences is, thus, a good and necessary en-
terprise. At the same time, however, revivalists of design-oriented policy analysis have dem-
onstrated a curious tendency: they have not devoted much attention to the kind of policy 
outcomes towards which they ultimately strive – presumably ‘valuable’ or indeed ‘successful’ 
public policies. Most have stuck with abstract notions of policy effectiveness, such as ‘creat-
ing a frame for action that may shape a range of policy responses’ (Peters et al, 2018: 19-20). 
While conceptually elegant, such formulations are difficult to operationalize and do not allow 
analysts to address the well-documented conceptual and methodological challenges inherent 
in making goal achievement the main criterion for policy success (Bovens et al, 2006; McCo-
nnell, 2010; Howlett, 2012). The policy design movement needs a richer and more relevant 
conceptualization of its key dependent variable to serve as a rock-solid foundation on which 
to pursue the ambition of identifying and testing the impact of various design principles and 
policy instrument mixes on policy success. 
If we are serious about reviving policy analysis as a design enterprise, and if we agree that such 
an enterprise should be empirically rooted in careful study of ‘what works’ (and what fails to 
work), then we must embrace the challenge of developing methods to assess the success or 
otherwise of public policies.  A fundamental challenge in this task will be to better represent 
the complex, dynamic, and contested nature of public policymaking in our conceptualization 
and measurement of the outcome of interest – successful policies and programs. Furthermore, 
we must do the empirical legwork of applying those standards to cases within and across policy 
sectors and jurisdictions (e.g. Bovens et al, 2001; Grace et al, 2017; De Francesco and Maggetti, 
2018) and then identify the patterns of conditions, factors, and mechanisms common to cases 
of policy success. Only then may we say that we have established ‘what works’ in successful 
public policies and programs. 
In this article, we provide the tools for doing so, and we explore what this may look like in 
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comparative case analysis. Building upon foundational efforts by Bovens et al (2001) and Mc-
Connell (2010) we first present an assessment tool for identifying dimensions and degrees of 
policy success. We then introduce three design factors whose (combined) impact on different 
dimensions of policy success we examine empirically: process inclusivity, degree of innovation, 
and the pace of change. We continue by presenting the design of this approach and reporting 
on the findings of a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) covering 33 case stud-
ies taken from two recent collaborative research projects on policy success (Compton and ‘t 
Hart, 2019 and Luetjens et al, 2019 - brief case descriptions can be found in the Appendix). We 
conclude this article by identifying the promises and pitfalls of our approach for the effort to 
rebuild policy analysis as a design science. 
Identifying policy successes: an assessment tool
Policy successes and policy failures are construed in stories. Undoubtedly ‘events’ – real im-
pacts on real people – are important factors in the shaping of those stories, but their impor-
tance is neither given nor straightforward.  To claim that a public policy, program, or project ‘X’ 
is a ‘success’ is effectively an act of interpretation (Bovens et al, 2001; Kay and Boxall, 2015). 
These interpretations are informed by the evaluative and oversight work of professional bod-
ies and think tanks (think of the OECD’s rankings or the PISA scores), government regulators, 
auditors and evaluators, and ad-hoc reviews and inquiries. It amounts to giving a strong vote of 
confidence to certain acts and practices of governance. It singles them out, elevates them, vali-
dates them. Conversely, labeling a particular instance or episode as an outright failure entails 
sharp negative feedback, a repudiation of a now compromised past. It sets in motion institu-
tional rituals in which account-giving is demanded, blame is apportioned, and learning must be 
shown to take place so as to avoid repetition (Van Berkel et al, 2016; Olavarria-Gambi, 2018). 
For such an act to be consequential it needs to stick: others must be attracted to its appeal and 
they need to emulate it. The claim ‘X is a success’ must become a widely accepted and shared 
narrative. When it does, ‘success’ becomes performative: X looks better and better because so 
many say so, so often (Van Assche et al, 2012). When the narrative endures, X becomes en-
shrined in society’s collective memory through repeated re-telling and other rituals. Examples 
of the latter include the conferral of awards on people or organizations associated with X, who 
are subsequently invited before captive audiences to spread the word; the high place that X oc-
cupies in rankings; the favorable judgments of X by official arbiters of public value in a society, 
such as audit agencies or watchdog bodies, not to mention the court of public opinion. 
Trying to establish ‘what works’ is treacherous terrain, and we must tread carefully (see Howl-
ett, 2014) to adopt a transparent and widely applicable conceptualization of ‘policy success’ 
to employ in the project at hand. Based on this conceptualization of ‘success,’ we must then 
identify a set of research tools to identify and characterize those ‘successes.’ To get there, we 
posit that policy assessment is necessarily a multi-dimensional, multi-perspectivist, and po-
litical process. At the most basic level we distinguish between two dimensions of assessment. 
First, the programmatic performance of a policy: success is essentially about designing smart 
programs that will really have an impact on the issues they are supposed to tackle, while de-
livering those programs in a manner to produce social outcomes that are valuable.  There is 
also the political legitimacy of a policy: success is the extent to which both the social outcomes 
of policy interventions, and also the manner in which they are achieved, narrated and widely 
accepted as meaningful and appropriate by stakeholders and accountability forums (Fischer 
1995; Hough et al 2010).
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The relation between these two dimensions of policy evaluation is not straightforward. There 
can be (and often are) asymmetries: politically popular policies are not necessarily program-
matically effective or efficient, and vice versa. Moreover, there is rarely a single shared norma-
tive and informational basis upon which all actors in governance processes assess performance, 
legitimacy, and endurance (Bovens et al. 2001). Many factors influence beliefs and practices 
through which people form judgments about governance. 
Heterogeneous stakeholders hold diverse vantage points, values, and interests regarding a 
policy, and thus may experience and assess it differently. An appeal to ‘the facts’ does not nec-
essarily help settle these differences. Like policymaking, policy evaluation occurs within a con-
text of multiple, often competing, cultural and political frames and narratives, each privileging 
different facts or considerations. As contexts change, new events occur, or players enter and 
leave the arena over time, the appeal and momentum of alternative frames and narratives 
can shift. Evaluation is inherently political in both approach and implications, no matter how 
deeply espoused the commitment to scientific rigor of many of its practitioners. This is not 
something we can get around. It is something we have to acknowledge without sliding into 
thinking that it is all and only political, and that therefore ‘anything goes’ when it comes assess-
ing the success or otherwise of a policy (Bovens et al. 2006). 
We build upon prior work in developing a useful model for evaluation. Adding to Bovens and ‘t 
Hart’s programmatic-political dichotomy, McConnell (2010) added a third perspective to pro-
duce a three-dimensional assessment map. We have adapted this three-dimensional assess-
ment for our purposes (see also Newman, 2014) and added an additional – temporal – dimen-
sion. It thus consists of the following components:
Programmatic assessment – This dimension reflects the focus of ‘classic’ evaluation research on 
policy goals, the theory of change underpinning it and the selection of the policy instruments 
it deploys – all culminating in judgments about the degree to which a policy achieves valuable 
social impacts.
Process assessment - The focus here is on how policy design and decision-making are organized 
and managed, and whether these processes contribute to vigilant public problem-solving in 
ways that enhance policy effectiveness through the application of rigorous deliberative pro-
cesses in which evidence, argument and persuasion are given a wide berth (Majone, 1989). 
Political assessment – This dimension assesses the degree to which policymakers and agencies 
involved in driving and delivering the policy can build and maintain supportive political coali-
tions, and the degree to which policymakers’ association with the policy enhances their repu-
tations. In other words, it examines both the political requirements for policy success and the 
distribution of political costs/benefits among the actors involved. 
Endurance assessment - The fourth dimension adds a temporal perspective. We surmise that 
the success or otherwise of a public policy, program or project should be assessed not through 
a one-off snapshot but as a multi-shot sequence or episodic film ascertaining how its perfor-
mance and legitimacy develop over time. Contexts change, unintended consequences emerge, 
surprises are thrown at history: robustly successful policies are those that respond to these 
dynamics through institutional learning and flexible adaptation in program (re)design and de-
livery, and through political astuteness in safeguarding supporting coalitions and maintaining 
public reputation and legitimacy.
Taking these four dimensions into account, we propose the following definition of a policy 
success: 
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A policy is successful to the extent that it purposefully creates widely valued social outcomes 
through rigorous processes and manages to sustain this performance for a considerable period of 
time, even in the face of changing circumstances. 
Table 1 presents an assessment framework that integrates these building blocks. Articulating 
specific elements of each dimension of success – programmatic, process, political, endurance 
– in unambiguous and conceptually distinct terms, this framework lends a structure to both 
contemporaneous evaluation and dynamic consideration of policy developments over time. 
Table 1. A Policy Success Assessment Map
Programmatic 
assessment:
Purposeful and valued 
action
Process assessment:
Thoughtful and fair 
policymaking practices
Political assessment:
Stakeholder and public 
legitimacy for the policy
A well-developed and 
empirically feasible public 
value proposition and theory 
of change underpins the 
policy.
The policy process allows 
for rigorous deliberation 
about the relevant values 
and interests; the hierarchy 
of goals and objectives; 
contextual constraints; the 
(mix of) policy 
instruments; and the 
institutional arrangements 
and capacities necessary 
for effective policy 
implementation.
A relatively broad and deep 
political coalition supports 
the policy’s value 
proposition, instruments 
and current results.
Achievement of (or 
considerable momentum 
towards) the policy’s 
intended and/or of other 
beneficial social outcomes.
Association with the pol-
icy enhances the political 
capital of the responsible 
policy-makers. 
Costs/benefits associated 
with the policy are 




sideration of a wide range 
of evidence, expertise and 
advice.
Association with the policy 
enhances the organizational 
reputation of the relevant 
public agencies.
Temporal assessment
Endurance of the policy’s value proposition (the proposed ‘high-level’ ends-means relation-
ships underpinning its rationale and design, combined with the flexible adaptation of its 
‘on-the-ground’ and ‘programmatic’ features to changing circumstances and in relation to 
performance feedback).
Degree to which the policy’s programmatic, process, and political performance is maintained 
over time
Degree to which the policy confers legitimacy on the broader political system
Source: Compton and ‘t Hart (2019) and Luetjens et al (2019) 
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How policy successes happen: exploring three design factors
Now that the outcome of interest – policy success – has been conceptualized, we move towards 
presenting the three design factors whose (singular and combined) contribution to the achieve-
ment of policy success we want to examine. The policy design literature offers many potentially 
relevant candidates, but the nature of our research design – fuzzy set analysis, which will be 
explained below – limits the number of conditions that we can consider. We have selected the 
following three, each of which has been the subject of sustained debate in the field (though 
many others are listed in extensive overviews such as Hood and Margetts, 2007): 
Process inclusivity: open and cooperative?
Theories of governance across the social sciences often consider the importance of including 
or representing diverse interests in decision-making. Much of this work has focused on the 
promise of broadly inclusive, consultative, or collaborative decision-making in the production 
of legitimate, just, creative, and sustainable solutions to public problems (Torfing, 2019). There 
are multiple theoretical foundations upon which such associations may be based. 
First, work on collective action problems has shown how self-organized bottom-up coopera-
tion among directly affected stakeholders (citizens) may be comparatively advantaged in pro-
ducing sustainable institutions (Ostrom, 1990). Local knowledge of contexts and informal 
institutions may lead to better tailored policy solutions, and collaboration in the process may 
facilitate greater trust and legitimacy in the process and outcome. Second, public management 
theory has long reiterated the importance of including actors who are intimately involved 
in front-line implementation and public service delivery at the ‘front end’ of policy design. 
These can include not only street-level bureaucrats in line agencies but also citizens and civil 
society groups who effectively co-produce public services (Alford, 2009) as well as non-profits 
and firms contracted to deliver public services. Including them in policy design enables their 
experiential knowledge of ‘what actually works’ (and what definitely does not) to weigh into 
decisions about the (mix of) policy instruments to be deployed and the way in which imple-
mentation processes are being structured (Gouillart and Hallett, 2015). The inclusion of and 
deliberation with a range of societal actors in forums previously reserved for elected officials 
is valued not only on the basis of democratic principles of equity and representation, but also 
for practical gains from more effective and legitimate policy design and public value production 
(Bryson et al, 2014). 
We therefore expect that the level of inclusivity of policy design processes may be an important 
condition of a public policy, program, or plan. Tightening or widening the circle of stakeholders, 
merely informing or actively involving them, and at what stage in the policy design process, are 
key options around inclusivity that policy designers and network managers can purposefully 
choose (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 252). But does it matter if they do? In our empirical study 
we shall examine whether and how process inclusivity conduces towards policy success. 
Degree of innovation: exploitation or exploration?
Policy designers and analysts typically face two alternatives when it comes to making design 
decisions. The first option is to refine and extend existing policies, programs, and instruments 
by drawing from experience both within and outside their jurisdiction. To improve and to learn, 
policymakers are encouraged to cast their attention to instances of success to identify and 
then exploit ‘what works’ in their own professional domains (Bennett, 1991). Acclaimed ‘best 
practices’ from other professions and jurisdictions both at home and abroad can also serve as 
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models. In its ideal typical form, this process of policy transfer is expected to follow a certain 
sequence. First, policymakers identify a policy or program area within their own jurisdiction 
that they want to make progress on. Solutions are then adopted that copy past experiences of 
their own or programs that have run abroad. Exploitation thus involves continuity through 
inheritance, the use of analogies and imitation. However, when the keenness to consolidate 
and copy trumps the discipline to first experiment and adapt in the new context, exploitation-
based policy designs may end in disappointment.
The second possibility is to pursue policy options that are new and thus untested within the ju-
risdiction, sector, or network at hand. This explorative mode involves at a minimum the explic-
it tailoring to local conditions of programs and policy instrument mixes borrowed elsewhere, 
and more radically the development of new frames on existing conditions and problems, the 
engagement of new stakeholders or a realignment of existing stakeholders, a search for knowl-
edge that departs from established truths, the discovery of new values or the recalibration of 
existing values and calculi (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2016). In combination, these may gener-
ate completely new policy designs and delivery mechanisms that have the potential to increase 
public problem-solving capacities and forge progress on issues that defied existing governance 
repertoires. 
There is no ‘right’ choice between these two modes as they each have their own risks and re-
wards. Established practices that over time have been tried, tested, and improved on through 
learning processes minimize the risk of surprise. Policy design processes relying exclusively 
on established processes, however, run the risk of creating rigid approaches which prove dif-
ficult to adapt once circumstances change (Hacker, 2004). Conversely, the potential promise of 
new possibilities and practices is enticing but inherently laden with uncertainty and thus risk. 
Strong reliance on exploration can mean that undeveloped ideas turn into costly investments 
which may not yield the expected public value (March, 1991). 
In our research design, we include the condition of ‘degree of innovation’ to ascertain the ex-
tent to which key elements of policy design were imitated or invented. Invention is taken to 
mean the development of something that is entirely new to the jurisdiction or sector in which 
it is being applied, though it may not necessarily be new to the rest of the world (Rogers, 2003: 
43). Imitation, in contrast, suggests that core elements of the policy’s design were inherited, 
borrowed, transferred, or emulated.  
Pacing of change: steps or leaps?
Much policy design activity is remedial and aspirational at the same time. It rests on what 
has famously been called ‘problemistic search’ (Cyert and March, 1963; Posen et al, 2018), 
aiming to move issues, groups, or communities away from a status quo that has undesirable 
features towards a more agreeable future state. A key question facing policy designers is how 
such movement can be accomplished. This question has complex behavioral (how empirically 
valid is the ‘theory of change’ upon which the current policy design and in particular its policy 
instrument mix relies?), institutional (what changes in existing capacities, rules, repertoires 
and routines of implementing actors are required to enable effective delivery of the policy?), 
and political (how to build and maintain sufficiently powerful coalitions that support the social 
change sought by the policy?) ramifications. 
This is delicate work: the status quo in any social system is a negotiated order, and efforts to 
purposefully change it will bring discomfort to all or parts of that system, expose patterns of 
privilege and disadvantage, question institutionalized beliefs and norms, and generally require 
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people to ‘do things differently’. Change is fraught with uncertainty and conflict, and systems 
work very hard – consciously and unconsciously – to avoid it. Policy designers whose reach 
(the scope of their ambitions) exceeds their grasp (their ability to overcome or circumnavigate 
inertia and pushback) will be punished by seeing their best laid plans come to naught, or worse. 
In dealing with these challenges, one of the key conditions that policymakers can manipulate 
involves what Heifetz et al (2009) call ‘pacing’ the work of change: assessing when to push the 
accelerator, when to switch gears, and when to hit the brakes. In the policy sciences this has 
been the subject of robust debate. On the one hand, there are those who argue that within 
polycentric systems, purposeful social change can only come about through relatively small 
steps: a succession of compromises that work in roughly the same direction (Lindblom, 1979; 
Rothmayr Allison and Saint-Martin, 2011; Hayes, 2017). On the other hand, however, are 
those who argue that incremental compromises are simply not good enough when addressing 
large and urgent challenges. A status quo may be simply unacceptable, or even threatening. To 
effect sufficient change, it may be necessary to muster ambition, vision, power, and capacity 
to move more boldly and quickly than ‘politics as usual’ tends to allow (Dror, 1986, 2001). Or, 
change may require clever use of ‘windows of opportunity’ that – sometimes predictably but 
more often erratically – present themselves in the form of incidents, outrages, and crises (Boin 
et al, 2009; Hogan and Feeney, 2012). 
The condition ‘pace of policy adoption’ has been incorporated into our design to address this de-
bate. We examine to what extent slow-paced and incrementally constructed policy, as opposed 
to the forging of fast-paced ‘crash or crash through’ (the dictum of Australia’s most reforming 
prime minister Gough Whitlam, 1972-74) policy change, are conducive to policy success. 
A comparative examination of thirty-three cases: research design 
Policy processes involve many factors which operate at multiple levels and in combination with 
one another to shape outcomes of interest. The study of policy success thus encourages an 
explanation using combinatory logic. In this analysis, we are not seeking causal explanation 
or formal comparison, nor do we endeavor to arrive at universal (or even external) generaliz-
ability or estimation of average effects, let alone aim to identify (probabilistic) empirical regu-
larities. Our goal is to study how policy outcomes (dimensions and levels of policy success) are 
produced through the confluence and interplay of certain ‘designable’ features of the policies 
in question. Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is well-suited to this task. 
QCA (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012) is a comparative case-oriented research approach suit-
able for unearthing complex patterns of causality across a universe of cases. It entails a collec-
tion of techniques based on set theory and Boolean algebra, enabling logical reasoning about 
actual cases, their conditions, and how outcomes emerge from a combination of these condi-
tions. By comparing configurations and pooling similar cases together, it allows researchers 
to explore similarities and differences across comparable cases. QCA has both descriptive and 
explanatory uses, which may include summarizing data, creating typologies, evaluating exist-
ing hypotheses, and developing new theories. 
The main difference between QCA and other more quantitative research methods lies in the 
idea of causality underpinning the approach (Ragin, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). Methods such as statistical analysis tend to imply mono-causality and 
focus on the estimate of each independent variable’s separate effect on the variation of the 
dependent variable. In contrast, QCA aims to produce multi-causal explanations. It focuses on 
combinations of conditions rather than single variables and does not assume that a unique ‘so-
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lution’ can account for the occurrence and non-occurrence of a particular outcome (Vis, 2012). 
In QCA methodology, outcome values within and across cases are accounted for in terms of 
distinct configurations of conditions. Once cases have been selected, QCA-analysis proceeds by 
specifying the outcome dimensions that are the focus of analysis and then by viewing each of 
these dimensions as a ‘set’ in which cases can have varying degrees of membership (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2010). Here we employ fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) only as a data analysis tech-
nique that aims to identify empirical patterns in the data. FsQCA was selected as it allows us to 
make fine-grained distinctions both between and within sets (Ragin, 2008). That is, it captures 
variation across cases both in degree and in kind.
In fsQCA, explanations are expressed in terms of necessity and sufficiency. First, we check for 
the presence of necessary conditions and then verify whether there was overlap between nec-
essary conditions for the presence of policy success and its absence (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012). Following this, we turn to the analysis of sufficiency through the construction of truth 
tables. The truth table effectively synthesizes how many cases adhere to a certain pattern, and 
if they consistently show the same outcome. If a particular pattern is consistent, then these 
rows are used in a minimization procedure which produces a particular solution term. Here, we 
opted for the conservative solution as no logical remainders (no empty truth table rows) ap-
peared. To arrive at the conservative solution, sensitivity and robustness tests were conducted. 
This involves adjusting the consistency threshold to detect the robustness of the resulting solu-
tions. The general standard is considered to be 0.80 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), which 
was run first. If consistency is set below 0.8, then it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain 
that a relationship exists. From 0.80 to 0.83, the solution terms obtained were robust. Setting 
the threshold above 0.85 produced no solution terms. Setting the threshold at 0.83 allowed us 
to explain more of the cases.1  
Case Selection
Given our goal of identifying the combination of conditions which are conducive to successful 
outcomes, we limited our sample to cases of success. Each case in our sample was drawn from 
two larger collaborative projects, which collectively produced 33 in-depth case studies of policy 
success1. Candidate cases were identified as a ‘great policy success’ by expert scholars in the rel-
evant policy domain along more than one but preferably all of the four success dimensions dis-
tinguished above: procedural, programmatic, political and endurance assessment. We sought 
cases of seen successes, which are not only successful (which we might posit is a more common 
condition than is popularly acknowledged), but also recognized as such. To find these gems, 
i.e., the projects from which we drew our cases, we consulted with experts and academics in a 
range of policy domains (environmental, public works or infrastructure, social welfare, health-
care, technology, and economic policy) to identify cases meeting the criteria for ‘policy success.’ 
By offering insight into occurrences of policy success across varied contexts, the case studies in 
the two collaborative projects were designed to increase awareness that government and public 
policy actually work remarkably well, at least some of the time. In selecting cases for inclusion 
in the two collaborative volumes, some cases were removed due to concerns or disagreements 
between experts on a case’s level of success. The cases were deliberately chosen to cover a broad 
range of issues, challenges, and policy sectors. These include cases of different modes (from 
1 — The consistency score indicates the extent to which the configuration is always associated with a given outcome. 
The coverage score reflects the percentage of cases that the configuration can explain. That is, how well a combination 
of conditions can adequately explain an outcome of interest..
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top-down central steering to open, deliberative and collaborative processes) and levels (from 
urban to the global) of governance. Though somewhat skewed to countries consistently rank-
ing among the best governed in the world, the volume includes cases of federal and unitary, 
parliamentary and presidential, and Westminster and consensual systems of government. All 
of the cases – except Brazil’s Bolsa Familia scheme and healthcare performance in Singapore – 
come from countries within the OECD. 
Restricting our sample to successful cases may concern those more accustomed to a more 
quantitative or probabilistic logic of inference. Though criteria for sample selection vary across 
the quantitative-qualitative divide (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006), it is agreed that ‘the cases you 
choose affect the answers you get’ (Geddes, 2003). Selecting cases on the value of the depend-
ent variable can profoundly bias statistical findings, fouling generalization and average effect 
estimation (Heckman, 1976). There are, however, defensible reasons to violate the dependent 
variable rule and select only or mostly ‘positive’ cases (Brady and Collier, 2010). Case selection 
should be a deliberate and well-considered procedure tailored to the specific research ques-
tion at hand and type of explanation sought (Brady and Collier 2010; King et al. 1994). In this 
project, we do not seek to estimate average effects. We instead seek to identify pathways to 
success. 
Coding Protocol and Calibration
Translating information into membership scores for fuzzy sets (so-called ‘calibration’) requires 
clear concepts for conditions and the outcome. Our calibration strategy involved the develop-
ment of a rubric or coding scheme to assign values for the outcome and the conditions. We opt-
ed for a four-value fuzzy scale. A four-value scheme is particularly advisable when researchers 
have a substantial amount of information about cases, but the nature of evidence is frequently 
not identical across cases. Similarly, with increasing levels of differentiation it becomes ever 
more difficult to identify both theory-based and empirically observable distinctions between 
the values. We accordingly first operationalized the four dimensions of policy success of Table 1 
into a fuzzy set table, assigning four possible scores indicating ‘membership of success’ on each 
dimension (see Table 2). A case which scored 0.33 or less was considered out of the set, whereas 
a case that scored 0.67 or more was considered in the set.
Table 2. Operational coding rubric for dimensions and degrees of policy success
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We then operationalized the three conditions we expect to be associated with successful policy 
outcomes (see Table 3). The 33 cases were coded according to the rubric (see Appendix 2). Ini-
tially, each author was responsible for coding a third of the cases. To ensure the reliability of 
these initial coding decisions, each author coded an additional set of cases that had already been 
coded by a different author. These coding decisions were then compared to identify discrepan-
cies. Some minor discrepancies existed but these concerned differences in degree rather than 
in kind. That is, no discrepancies were found as to whether the case should be considered ‘in’ 
the set (either fully, or more in than out). Similarly, there were no discrepancies as to whether 
a case should be considered ‘out’ (either fully, or more out than in). Any remaining points of 
doubt were resolved by an additional round of coding by each author and cross-checking one 
another’s codes and justifications. 
Two difficulties emerged in this process, which we dealt with in turn. First, QCA methodology 
requires each case to be scored on all assessment dimensions in order to be included in analysis. 
For this reason, we were forced to drop two cases from the sample: Avoiding the Global Finan-
cial Crisis and Nuclear Free New Zealand. The financial regulation case could not be scored on 
‘endurance’ as the case focuses entirely on a single moment in time (the late 2008-early 2009 
panic on financial markets), and New Zealand’s non-nuclear stance could not be scored on 
‘process’ as it was principally a one-shot symbolic policy by pronouncement. A second difficulty 
emerged in scoring the case of the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer. As the only 
transnational case in the sample, we consulted a leading expert of international regimes and 
treaties to suitably approximate our ‘pacing of change’ condition (see de Block and Vis, 2018). 
The remaining difficulties were remedied by adjusting the initial indicators of ‘endurance’ and 
‘pace of change’ until properly codable and yet theoretically valid operationalizations were ar-
rived at (cf. Basurto and Speer, 2012). 
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To arrive at the outcome(s) of interest, we took the minimum value across different combina-
tion of success ‘sets’. The minimum membership score, in effect, indicates the degree of mem-
bership of a case in a combination of sets (de Block and Vis, 2018). Its use follows ‘weakest link 
reasoning’ (Ragin, 2000). This means that for a case to be considered both programmatically 
and politically successful, it needs to have scored a minimum of 0.67 across both dimensions.2 
We were first interested in identifying pathways to programmatic and political success. This 
minimum value strategy was again used for the programmatic, political and process success 
outcome, as well as the programmatic, political, process and endurance success outcome. By 
doing so, we assert that success is not binary, or even a one-dimensional spectrum. Instead, it 
is multi-dimensional. By identifying and measuring multiple outcomes through the intersec-
tion of different success dimensions, we assert that a policy is considered successful when it 
scores at least 0.67 across the dimensions that are taken into consideration. The advantage of 
this method is that it acknowledges and accounts for the possibility that there is more than one 
formulation of success, and allows for further (future) theorizing on the different mechanisms 
that might underlie the manifestation of these different “routes” to success. The disadvantage 
of this approach, however, is that it may increase complexity. Recognizing the multidimension-
ality of success and allowing for different combinations of conditions to produce a “success” 
necessarily complicates any effort at causal or explanatory theory.  Our goal here, though, is 
not to produce such theory.
Identifying routes to policy success: findings
The number of possible configurations generated in a QCA truth table is determined by the 
number of conditions used. The general rule is 2k, where k is the number of conditions. As we 
have three conditions, the truth table (see table 4) shows eight logically possible configurations 
of those conditions. The technique then matches the cases included in our sample to the differ-
ent combinations of conditions. 









1 0 1 0.85
Bolsa Familia, UK Tobacco Con-
trol, NZ Early Childhood, NZ 
Whanau Ora, AU HIV/AIDS
2 — We applied QCA and SetMethods packages using R software (Dusa, 2019) to run the analysis.
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1 1 0 0.83
Dutch Delta, AU Plain 
Packaging, AU GST
1 0 0 0.82
Finnish Education, Montreal 
Protocol, Marvellous Melbourne, 
NZ Waitangi, AU Competition 
Policy
1 1 1 0.80 GI Bill, AU Child Support
0 0 0 0.78
Danish Urban Planning, 
German Labour Market
0 1 1 0.63
NZ KiwiSaver, AU HECS, AU 
Gun Control, NZ Fiscal 
Responsibility
0 0 1 0.63
Singapore Healthcare, NHS 
Waiting Times, Estonia e-gov, 
Alameda Corridor, AU Water 
Markets, NZ Accident Comp
0 1 0 0.56
Norwegian Future Fund, AU 
Medicare, AU GFC Stimulus, 
NZ Economic Turnaround
Source: The Authors
In our analysis, we investigated three outcomes of interest, each being a different combination 
of the four success criteria. The first outcome of interest we considered was Programmatic and 
Political (PP) Success. The fsQCA analysis finds that there are essentially two routes which, if 
followed, are sufficient for leading to this type of success. The first route is to ensure the policy 
design process is inclusive. In other words, if policymakers want to achieve both programmatic 
and political success, then they must effectively consult and collaborate with affected societal 
actors throughout the policy process. The second route to PP Success results from a combina-
tion of a slow pace of change and a low degree of innovation. This pathway shows that policies 
which build on or are in line with previous efforts and are adopted slowly over a series of steps 
can achieve programmatic and political success. 
It should be noted that either of these two pathways are considered sufficient, but not neces-
sary, for producing PP Success. In fuzzy-set theory, logical AND (designated as *) refers to the 
combination of sets. Logical OR (marked as +) refers to the intersection of sets. The presence 
of a condition is denoted in upper-case, while the absence of a condition is in lower-case. In 
fuzzy-set notation, the so-called solution term of our analysis of PP success is represented as:
PROCESS INCLUSIVITY + pace of change*degree of innovation => PP (coverage: 0.73;
consistency = 0.79)
However, as Tables 1 and 2 have shown, there is more to policy success than programmatic 
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and political achievement. To enrich the assessment of success incorporated in the analysis, 
we focused on two additional outcomes of interest: Programmatic, Political and Process (PPP) 
and a ‘full Monty’ Programmatic, Political, Process and Endurance (PPPE). When these were 
added to our analysis, it turned out that while the routes leading to both these new outcomes 
were identical, there were notable differences between these routes and those that produce the 
original PP outcome. 
Again, there were two routes. The first is that of an inclusive process, fast pace and a low de-
gree of innovation. The second again entails an inclusive process, but this time combined with 
a slow pace and high degree of innovation. In fuzzy-set notation, the solution term for these 
routes is represented as:
PROCESS INCLUSIVITY*PACE OF CHANGE*degree of innovation + 
PROCESS INCLUSIVITY*pace of change*DEGREE OF INNOVATION => PPPE 
(coverage: 0.55; consistency: 0.86)
What does this teach us? Clearly inclusive design processes are pivotal if multi-dimensional (and 
thus enduring) success is to be achieved. Interestingly enough, this finding is based on a case 
sample that is skewed towards cases from majoritarian democracies, where inclusive consulta-
tion traditionally is not strongly embedded in the political culture of ‘winner takes all’. Perhaps 
Lijphart (1999) did have a point in his ‘evidence-based’ extolling of the virtues of consensual 
democracies – where broader inclusion of groups, voices and interests is not a matter of choice 
but a political necessity. 
Though pivotal, our findings indicate that inclusivity is not the only important factor. Varia-
tions in the degree of innovation sought by policymakers also determine which design route 
needs to be taken. To be considered successful on all four dimensions, policies that are low on 
innovation are best driven at a relatively fast pace (but through an inclusive process – which 
presumes policy designers need to adopt mechanisms for organizing broad consultation and 
perhaps co-design that do not lead to highly protracted deliberation and thus slow down the 
pace of the policy process). In contrast, if a highly innovative policy approach is to be success-
ful, ample time must be taken for it to be developed inclusively. 
To briefly illustrate both routes in practice, we turn to two examples from our case set: the 
2008 Dutch Delta Reforms and Brazil’s Bolsa Família. 
Dutch Delta reforms: an inclusive, fast paced, and imitative policy design
Reform of the Dutch Delta approach illustrates the first ‘path to success’ identified by our anal-
ysis (based on Van Buuren, 2019). The review and revision of the existing water management 
policy that took place in the Netherlands during the latter 2000s was (1) inclusive, (2) fast-
paced, and (3) highly imitative. Following increased awareness of the risks of climate change, 
the Second Delta Committee was created in 2008 to begin inclusive and collaborative delib-
eration on how to reform existing and internationally renowned Dutch Delta management 
programs. Those reforms passed in 2010 and revised the existing program to ensure the Dutch 
would remain safe from the encroaching sea in future decades.
Stakeholders from multiple levels of government, the private sector, and interest groups, as 
well as policymakers and bureaucrats, were included in the decision-making process or were 
invited to join advisory committees. The revised approach implemented in 2010 built upon 
and respected existing institutions and processes. Much about Dutch water policy was kept the 
same, and policy changes made were small and mostly voluntary. The second era of the Dutch 
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Delta approach self-consciously adopted a collaborative and piecemeal approach to adaptation 
based upon but iteratively complementing pre-existing policies. This way of designing the pol-
icy process strongly contributed to the legitimacy and authority of the ensuing policy reforms. 
Bolsa Família: an inclusive, slow paced, and innovative policy design
The Brazilian conditional cash transfer (CCT) program Bolsa Família illustrates the second ‘path 
to success’ identified by our analysis (based on Paiva et al, 2019). Design and passage of this 
policy was (1) inclusive, (2) slow-paced, and (3) highly innovative. Currently reaching over 20% 
of the Brazilian population, CCTs have achieved significant results and Bolsa Família has been 
widely recognized as a major policy success. 
Following a new democratic constitution in 1988 and increased decentralization, a debate took 
place among politicians and academics about the best policy to achieve poverty reduction. 
Reflecting the advice of academics, the first CCT model of social support was implemented 
in 1995 by two Brazilian municipalities. The highly innovative policy soon spread to other 
municipalities in the country. Federal implementation of CCT programs did not occur until 
2001 under the Cardoso administration, which was three years after the Mexican government 
had sent a delegation to Brazil to study local-level CCTs and subsequently implemented their 
own national CCT program, Progresa. After years of experimentation at the local-level, and 
months of deliberation at the federal level, fragmented CCT programs were consolidated into 
one national program under the Lula da Silva administration in 2003: Bolsa Família. Enduring 
programmatic, political, and procedural success was achieved in this case by an inclusive and 
deliberative design that allowed highly innovative policy ideas to take root and weather critical 
scrutiny and skepticism over several years. 
Conclusions: towards designing for success 
In this paper we asked the grand question: whether policy success can be designed (and if 
so, how). That question obviously cannot be answered comprehensively on the basis of just 
one comparative study. We do hope, however, to have demonstrated some progress in moving 
towards a better grasp of the issues involved. Firstly, we offer Table 1 as an assessment tool, 
which analysts can use to gauge different dimensions and levels of policy success. Adding the 
‘endurance’ criterion to McConnell’s (2010) trichotomy of programmatic, process and political 
has, we believe, gone some way towards a more temporally sensitive understanding of success. 
A limitation of the assessment method used in this article has been its static nature (one sum-
mative assessment of policy histories spanning years and sometimes decades). Much can be 
gained by applying the assessment tool at different points in a policy’s trajectory, creating a 
more ‘film-like’ grasp of how levels of success across the different dimensions develop through 
time. Doing so can generate important questions on how and why such variations can occur, 
and what design practices can contribute to success becoming achieved earlier, more consist-
ently and across more dimensions. 
Secondly, comparing and contrasting the four dimensions of success in the empirical analy-
sis has highlighted the relevance of Bovens et al’s (2001) observation that programmatic and 
political success do not necessarily align. Several cases in our sample exhibited ‘mismatches’: 
considerable programmatic achievements not matched by deep, wide and stable support (e.g. 
New Zealand’s fledgling Whanau Ora policy of taking the Maori extended family unit as the lo-
cus for social policy interventions), or politically (temporally) popular and willed polices whose 
programmatic impact was relatively ephemeral (e.g. Tony Blair’s ‘cutting the wait at the NHS’ 
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initiatives). Similar mismatches exist between programmatic (or political) and endurance as-
sessments (policies ‘peaking’ at one point in time but being unable to be consolidated across 
changes of government, fiscal conditions and departures of key sponsors). Studying these mis-
matches and contrasting them with cases of more consistent and comprehensive success using 
structured and focused comparison of key decisions and processes should yield insights about 
what design practices may be conducive to less conflicted and more enduring forms of success. 
Thirdly, the present study is not without methodological limitations. One stems from our re-
liance on secondary analysis of narrative case studies written by a multitude of authors. All 
authors of the original cases worked with (a version of) Table 1 as a central tool for structuring 
their narratives, but they were not instructed to explicitly cover the three design factors pre-
sented in this paper. In other words, coverage of all conditions of interest has been somewhat 
uneven, complicating the coding process. Clearly, a ‘triple hermeneutic’ has been at work in the 
present research’s design: we were interpreting the authors’ interpretations of the case actors’ 
interpretations of these policies. Future comparative studies of policy success should find ways 
of reducing the potential ‘noise’ that can occur in the present set-up. 
Another limitation is a consequence of our decision to select a population of ‘success cases.’ 
Selecting a sample of cases based on the outcome (success) may raise eyebrows among those 
committed to constructing samples based on (maximal) variation on that dependent variable. 
As discussed above, however, we have been conscientious in our inferences, and are therefore 
on firm ground by ‘selecting on the dependent variable.’ By constructing four dimensions and 
levels of success and coding the cases accordingly, we generated sufficient variation to allow 
the fsQCA-analysis to yield valid inferences and meaningful results. We have uncovered the 
(combinations of) conditions conducive to policy success—a result of real value to the litera-
ture. To generate conclusions about the average or marginal contribution of different factors 
to outcomes, a different research design should be employed. To do this, future research could 
endeavor to contrast highly (comprehensively and enduringly) successful cases with ‘others’ 
(comprehensive and chronic policy failures), holding constant policy areas and jurisdictions 
(Bovens et al, 2001 present a good example).    
In sum, this study provides analysts with concepts and tools for achieving a more ‘granular’ 
understanding of the layered meanings of the term ‘works’ in the phrase uttered so often by 
political decision makers and policy designers that “we should adopt ‘what works’”. It also ad-
vances our knowledge of what principles and practices of policy design – specifically around 
inclusion, pacing, and innovation – can help or hinder the achievement of policy success, cast-
ing light on the nature of the ‘what’ in that same phrase. This is only a modest beginning, which 
we hope will inspire others to build upon and test the impact of other configurations of design 
conditions so that a decade from now the field will possess an evidence-based catalogue of 
‘tried and tested’ design strategies.
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Appendix
The core features and brief case summaries of the 33 cases under investigation are presented in Ap-
pendix 1. A description of the coding protocol and justifications are reported in Appendix 2 (further 
coding justifications are available upon request). All the material used in the coding of these cases 
can be found in Compton and ‘t Hart (2019) and Luetjens et al. (2019).
Appendix 1: 33 Policy Success Cases (reported and sourced in Compton and ‘t Hart, 
2019 and Luetjens et al, 2019)
Overview of cases
Feature Cases
Majoritarian democracies (two-party systems) 24






Note: Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, Singapore’s healthcare performance and the Montreal Protocol are 
not included in the majoritarian/consensus classification. The Montreal Protocol is not included 
in the federal/unitary classification. 
Brief case summaries
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia scheme – The world’s largest conditional cash transfer scheme that lifted mil-
lions out of extreme poverty.
Healthcare performance in Singapore – How Singapore has drastically increased its health outcomes 
while keeping costs low.
Cutting waiting times in the NHS – Combination of resolute political leadership and judicious policy 
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analysis that enabled Britain’s National Health Service to process its millions of clients much quicker. 
UK’s tobacco control regime – How the UK designed and implemented innovative policies which 
framed tobacco as a health concern to successfully build support around the initially unpopular 
tobacco ban.
The GI Bill – How the United States provided social support to soldiers returning from the Second 
World War to ensure macro-economic security, and had the unintended consequence of building 
social capital. 
Finland’s secondary school system – How a small nation on Europe’s northern periphery’s school sys-
tem became a global brand in ‘how to do public education’.
Estonia’s digital transformation – How a post-communist state forged a global reputation as a leader 
in digital government.
The Los Angeles region’s Alameda rail corridor project – A balanced governance and creative financing 
arrangement transforming a tangled web of rail lines into a single corridor that relieved traffic con-
gestion and reduced air and water pollution in the Los Angeles region. 
The new Dutch Delta strategy – How a nation in which two-thirds of the population live below the 
current sea level secures its future by reinventing its famed water management strategy so as to en-
able proactive and creative adaptation to the effects of climate change. 
Copenhagen’s Five Finger Plan – How the Danish capital successfully avoided urban sprawl and overly 
sense and chaotic urbanization through early adoption and sustained adaptation of a comprehen-
sive urban planning regime. 
Norway’s Petroleum Fund – How Norway’s policymakers purposefully dodged the bullet of the ‘re-
source course’ and channeled its oil revenues into what has become the world’s biggest national 
pension fund. 
Germany’s labor market reforms – How Europe’s biggest but notoriously rigid and sluggish post-re-
unification economy was lifted into the economic powerhouse it has since become. 
The Montreal Protocol – How the world managed to negotiate and implement a global regulatory 
regime that helped the stratospheric ozone layer recover from the damage sustained by decades’ 
worth of ozone depleting substances.
‘Marvellous Melbourne’ – How the once staid state and struggling capital of Victoria, Australia trans-
formed itself into a cosmopolitan metropolis named ‘The World’s Most Liveable City’ six times in a 
row (from 2011 to 2017) by The Economist’s Intelligence Unit.  
Australia’s response to HIV/AIDS – How an effective national policy response to HIV/AIDS evolved 
across challenging social, political, epidemiological, medical and generational contexts.
Australia’s Higher Education Contribution Scheme – The first national income-contingent university 
tuition fee loan program that saw enrolments triple and inspired similar loan schemes around the 
world. 
Australia’s economic crisis management – Massive pre-emptive macro-economic policy response to 
the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 which led to the avoidance of recession but caused heated debate 
about its methods.
Australia’s Child Support Scheme – Increasing the proportion of children of separated parents re-
ceiving financial support as well as increasing the contributions paid to government by separated 
parents. 
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Australian water markets – A transformative and widely supported change to water allocation pro-
cesses in the Murray-Darling Basin 
Australia’s National Competition Policy – A sustained and impactful program of product market lib-
eralization hailed as an example of successful collaboration between Australia’s federal and state 
governments.  
Australia’s gun control reform – Following a mass shooting in Tasmania, the federal government 
swiftly implemented a national firearm policy that turned Australia into a world leader in the pre-
vention of armed violence. 
Australia’s Goods and Services Tax – A once highly contentious tax policy reform that was well-de-
signed, effectively implemented and enjoyed broad political and public support. 
Australia’s Medicare – The foundation of Australia’s universal health care system that evolved into a 
widely popular institution.
Australia’s avoidance of financial institutions’ collapses in 2008-9 – Good luck, a sound regulatory envi-
ronment and the adherence of banks to ‘boring but safe’ business models allowed Australian finan-
cial institutions to dodge the bullet of the Global Financial Crisis.
Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging – The first nation to implement tobacco plain packaging laws, ef-
fectively encouraging current smokers to quit and dissuading potential new smokers from starting.
New Zealand’s economic turnaround – A country at the brink of economic collapse in the 1980s trans-
formed its fortunes through a radical, consistent and impactful suite of reform strategies.
New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme – Unique universal accident-insurance system, based 
on compulsory contributions into a state monopoly with no right to sue. 
Nuclear Free New Zealand – How despite major power pressures to desist, a small state adopted and 
sustained a nuclear free stance that has attracted widespread support across the political spectrum. 
Treaty of Waitangi Settlements – New Zealand’s policy to address, negotiate, and settle historical 
grievances arising from the Crown’s Treaty of Waitangi breaches.
New Zealand’s 1994 Fiscal Responsibility Act – Engraining the principle of fiscal responsibility in New 
Zealand budgetary practices and constitutional arrangements.
New Zealand’s Early Childhood Education Pathways – Comprehensive policy plan that greatly in-
creased young children’s participation in care and education.
New Zealand’s KiwiSaver pension scheme – Delivering one of the world’s lowest rates of poverty 
for the population aged 65 and over, while offering citizens flexibility to react to financial events 
throughout their lives.
New Zealand’s Whānau Ora – Implementing values-based innovative solutions for Māori communi-
ties, building their capacity for self-management.
Appendix 2: Coding Protocol and Exemplars
As discussed in the text, each author was responsible for coding a third of the cases. As these cases 
emerged from two broader collaborative projects, each author had extensive familiarity with the 
contents of each case, having been closely involved in the production phase. Each author had been 
involved in workshops where the case authors presented drafts of their cases. The authors then 
discussed and edited these drafts for inclusion in the two broader collaborative (edited volume) pro-
jects. The case authors were identified and selected as a result of their extensive experience either 
directly with the design and implementation of the policy under consideration, or given their sub-
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ject matter expertise. The case authors drew on previous interview material, their published works, 
and/or their direct experience in developing the case chapters. The case authors were given guiding 
questions for their case analysis (these can be found in Compton and ‘t Hart (2019) and Luetjens 
et al. (2019)). The result of these guiding questions is that the diverse set of cases are explored with 
a common set of reference points. This approach offers many opportunities for comparisons to be 
drawn out from across the whole set.
This common set of reference points facilitated the coding of these cases for the purposes of this 
article. Below, we offer three examples of our coding decisions. To justify the score, the authors re-
lied heavily on supporting material found in each case. As noted in the text, the authors first scored 
a third of the cases and then scored an additional set of cases that had previously been scored by a 
different author. The scores were then compared to identify discrepancies in the coding decisions. 
Few discrepancies were found. The main issue that emerged was during the initial round of coding. 
This had to do with the way in which the conditions and outcome were initially conceptualized. To 
rectify this, and to ensure that all cases (except Australia’s response to the Global Financial Crisis) 
could to be coded, the authors revisited the operationalization of their conditions and outcome(s). 
The operationalization(s) arrived at in Tables 1 and 2 represent the outcome of this effort
Finnish Comprehensive Education
Dimension Score (1-4) Explanation/consideration
Programmatic 4 Performance of the Finnish comprehensive education system is 
demonstrated in at least two dimensions: “economic growth aided 
by human resources; and…upward social mobility education af-
fords.” Evidence points to success in both economic and equality 
terms. Since the 1990s, the Finnish system “has basked in interna-
tional glory, being called one of the best in the world. This reputation 
is largely due to the successful performance of Finnish teenagers in 
the Programme for International Student Achievement (PISA), run 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).”
Process 4 The process of adopting the education system was long and delib-
erative. Drafting the legislation was done by “independent, broadly 
politically representative, and expert-based committees served as 
ad hoc organs in producing reports and drafting laws.” The eventual 
compromise on design of the program was based on expert research 
and deliberation.
Political 4 Initial implementation of the program resulted in a lasting compro-
mise around which different parties and interests eventually agreed. 
Stakeholders and policymakers associated with the system receive 
external (international) recognition, as well as domestic political 
rewards.
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Endurance 4 “Despite repeated criticism, institutional frame survived and is now 
a recognized and almost unchallenged part of the Finnish educa-
tion landscape.” Continuation of the program was in part due to the 
frequency of coalition governments in Finland, which almost always 
included some parties from the previous administration in the new 
government. What changes have occurred were minor calibrations 
of existing instruments. “…[I]n the last sixty years there has been 
no initiative to change the fundamental principles of the original 
policy establishing the comprehensive school system (Kauko et al. 
2015; Simola et al. 2017).”
Process 
Inclusivity
4 Over the decades of continued implementation, ideologically heter-
ogeneous coalitions continued the program. The process of design-
ing the program in the first place was deliberative and inclusive of 
multiple differing viewpoints.  The process “could be seen as fair in 
the sense that the opinions of the opposition were considered and 
deliberated in parliamentary decision making. However, disputes 
arose during the implementation phase concerning what had actu-
ally been agreed to in the policy.”
Pace of 
Change
1 “The political process leading to the complete reorganization of the 
formerly bipartite school system and the establishment of the com-
prehensive school and its implementation took more than three 
decades—and even longer if we track the origin of some of its con-
stitutive ideas. “ 
“Incremental advances eventually resulted in a critical juncture in 
which the comprehensive school was created in the late 1960s.”
Degree of 
Innovation
3 The author does not explicitly discuss the innovativeness of the 
1967 government bill that would create the comprehensive school 
committee. The degree of attention from external/international ac-
tors suggests that the Finnish system was innovative and remains 
unique.
Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme
Dimension Score (1-4) Explanation/consideration
Programmatic 3 HECS achieved its intended social outcomes by successfully facili-
tating expansion of the higher education and graduate population 
without compromising access. It’s role in facilitating an affordable 
and equitable means of funding higher education has created con-
siderable public value: “The tide of expanded participation lifted all 
boats.” However, the costs on students are still quite considerable. 
The debate as to the correct level of student charges versus public 
funding is ongoing. Determining how costs should be distributed 
has proved problematic.
144 In te r n a t ion a l  R e v ie w o f  P ubl i c  Pol i c y,  1 :2
Process 2 Highly centralized process; use of handpicked committees and ex-
ternal experts; the policy design process “occurred quickly, provid-
ing limited time or chance for opponents to disagree.” At that time, 
the innovative scheme had no international precedent: “it was un-
tested and there was no empirical evidence that it would succeed.” 
There was no published research paper setting out the idea that the 
government could refer to. 
Political 2 Both major parties now view HECS as an essential component of 
the higher education system. The model has been exported around 
the world. The architect, Bruce Chapman, has received international 
and national recognition and accolades. However, the Coalition (the 
Opposition party) was initially opposed, only coming around to the 
idea 5 years later. Similarly, the ALP Party Platform was initially op-
posed to fees – national student and staff unions lobbied the ALP 
Caucus. In its early years, it took time and resources to defend.
Endurance 3 Following the 1996 election, the Howard government “chose its re-
tention.” The goals of the policy have largely remained intact. How-
ever, HECS has been subject to changes often driven by the political 
attraction of budgetary savings. While HECS has been resilient and 
endured for the past 30 years, the rising stock and cost of debt and 
calls to reform the higher education sector pose challenges.
Process 
Inclusivity
2 “The Government was faced with the task of consulting with and 
convincing stakeholders and the public of the merits of the propos-
al.” The ACTU was brought on board after the development of the 
proposal. The policy decision process was set and controlled by the 
education minister: He handpicked committee members and secre-
tariat staff. “The consultation process was brief, but it was particu-
larly well focused.”
Pace of Change 4 The process moved quickly with HECS becoming law only 18 months 




4 Bruce Chapman’s report included the novel idea of an income con-
tingent charge to be repaid through the tax system following gradu-
ation, something no other country had previously implemented. 
“HECS was introduced on a Greenfield policy site, policy constraints 
and conflicts did not exist to divert the development process.”
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German Labour Market
Dimension Score (1-4) Explanation/consideration
Programmatic 3 The reforms were successful in that they “enabled the effective 
tackling of unemployment even during the worst recession in post-
war history which acted as a major test for the economy’s robust-
ness (Rinne and Zimmermann 2013).” Macroeconomic indicators 
suggest the policies were successful in meeting goals, but evidence 
of the effectiveness of compensatory measures is less clear.
Process 4 Choice of policy mixes were also well suited to the existing eco-
nomic model in Germany and have been updated (through continu-
ous trial and error) in the face of changing circumstances. The de-
signers—a ‘strategic centre’—relied heavily on the experiences of 
similar countries in making evidence-based policy decisions. Also, 
procedural success is evidenced in the Hartz Committee’s ability to 
enhance problem-solving capacity and to circumvent a ‘stalemate 
in corporatist policy making.’
Political 2 The passage and impacts of the Hartz reforms were highly conten-
tious. “While business and employer associations as well as con-
servative and liberal parties supported the Hartz reforms, unions, 
social welfare organisations, leftist parties, and parts of the public 
criticised social cutbacks.” However, “over time, both the inclusive-
ness (a process component) and breadth and depth of the societal 
legitimacy (a political component) of German labour market poli-
cies have improved.” Today, “there is no societal consensus on the 
core objectives of labour market policies, and there is a widespread 
sense of injustice.”
Endurance 3 The initial Hartz reform instruments are no longer in place, and 
have been replaced by subsequent reforms. The Hartz IV law has 
not been terminated or changed. These changes reflect evolution in 




1 As Spohr writes, “the composition of the Hartz Committee was not 
about inclusion and consensus but about expertise and a will to 
compromise.” Several important societal actors were left out of the 
design stage. This process “reduced procedural justice since social 
partnership negotiations serve the legitimisation of government 
actions; governments especially incorporate trade unions into 
policy making and implementation for their own political support 
(Hassel 2009).”
Pace of Change 1 The first reforms were passed in 2002, with laws coming into effect 
between 2003 and 2005.  The second wave of reforms were passed 
amid the great recession in 2009. Together these changes took 
place over more than 2 government terms.
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Degree of 
Innovation
1 The Hartz Reforms relied heavily on the experiences of others. 
As Spohr writes, “policy mixes like the Hartz reforms – activating 
the unemployed, improving their employability and making low-
skilled labour productive – had already been implemented quite 
successfully in social democratic Scandinavian welfare states such 
as Denmark and Sweden as well as in liberal Anglo-Saxon systems 
such as the UK and the US since the 1980s”
